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The teacher says to Calvin,​[1]​ `There will be an exam later today but you don’t believe that there will be, so the exam will come as a surprise’. Calvin cannot stop the teacher doing what she likes with regard to giving the exam, nevertheless he wants to win, albeit a small victory, by bringing it about that what she says is false. He has no control over the truth or falsity of the first conjunct of her statement, and so can only win by believing that there will be an exam. But, since he knows that the teacher tells the truth at least 95% of the time, in the absence of any relevant evidence to the contrary, Calvin cannot rationally believe that she is not telling the truth on this occasion. And she said that he does not believe that there will be an exam that day so, if he is rational, he will accept it as true that he does not believe that there will be an examination that day. He can only believe that there will be an exam that day (and hence win) if he is irrational. He has to believe that there will be an exam that day while somehow refusing to accept what the smallest amount of reflection would force him to accept — namely, that he does not believe it.
 
The Predictor in the eponymous TV game show says to Calvin, `As you can see, there is $10,000 in transparent Box A. In Box B, which is opaque and closed, and whose content cannot now be changed, I have put nothing if I have predicted that you will opt to take the content of both boxes. You can either take the content of both boxes or take just the content of Box B, and if I have predicted that you will do the latter, I will have placed $1000,000 in Box B’. Calvin cannot stop the Predictor doing what she likes with regard to the content of Box B, nevertheless he wants to win the maximum of $1,010,000 by bringing it about that he two-boxes, while the Predictor predicts that he is a one-boxer (and so has deposited $1,000,000 in Box B). But, since he knows that the Predictor is an excellent psychologist who has played this game with hundreds of different contestants and, on the basis of detailed studies of their psychological profiles, has predicted right at least 95% of the time, in the absence of any relevant evidence to the contrary, Calvin cannot rationally believe that she will be wrong on this occasion. And so he cannot rationally choose to two-box, and so, if rational, will one-box, thereby depriving himself of the chance of achieving his goal of winning $1010,000. He can only achieve that winning goal if he is irrational. He has to actually be a one-boxer (not just pretend to be one — the Predictor is wise to that ploy) while somehow refusing to accept that, when the crunch comes and he has to choose, he will be a two-boxer. 

The president of Philip Morris says to Calvin, `Here is a vial of toxin. I’ll give you $10M if you intend to drink it — just for having that intention. Whether or not you subsequently actually drink it, you keep the $10M.  The toxin will not kill you, but it is really nasty — it will have you writhing in agony for five days’. Calvin cannot alter the terms of the deal that the president has set out, nevertheless, he wants the best outcome for himself, which is obviously that he forms the intention to drink the toxin but doesn’t actually drink it. However, he is aware that, on at least 95% of occasions, refraining from performing a voluntary action is preceded by the intention to refrain from performing it, which is obviously incompatible with forming the intention to perform it. And so he cannot, on this occasion, rationally intend to drink the toxin while harbouring the plan to not drink it after that intention has been formed. He can only achieve the goal of intending to drink the toxin while avoiding the agonized writhing if he is irrational. He has to really intend to drink the toxin (the president does not pay out to fakers) while somehow refusing to accept that, when the crunch comes and he is to carry out that intention, he will acquire the intention to refrain from drinking it.

Despite apparently very different set-ups, the catch is common to all these problems with which Calvin is presented, as is the resulting bind where the possibility of winning is reserved only for the truly irrational. Calvin is currently busy trying to become irrational but, given the huge prizes he knows to be available for success in that venture, the more he tries, the more he shows himself incapable of succeeding.
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^1	  In order to get the right feel for this piece, please note that Calvin is not the preacher but the partner of Hobbes, who is not the philosopher but the tiger. Afficionados of paradox will know that the title of this paper refers to the Surprise Examination Paradox, the origins of which are lost in the mists of time, the Newcomb problem, which was invented by the physicist William Newcomb in 1960, and the Toxin Puzzle, due to the late Greg Kavka who published it in 1983. A simplified version of the standard Surprise Examination Paradox is used here. For discussion of these paradoxes, with references, see Clark: 2002.
